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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the context effect in the choice of public and 
private earthquake insurance contracts using data from a questionnaire survey 
completed by an identical set of approximately 2,000 households in 2008 and again in 
2009.    According to the 2008 survey, the public earthquake insurance (PEI) was not 
popular among those who felt that the premiums were too high.    On the other hand, 
the 2009 survey demonstrates that the choice of earthquake insurance  changed 
substantially when a hypothetical private earthquake insurance contract, much more 
expensive than the PEI, was added to a choice menu.   In particular, those who had 
initially felt that PEI was too expensive tended to find it less expensive relative to 
private  insurance,  and worth purchasing.    A crucial advantage of the above choice 
architecture is that including additional options helps private insurance companies to 
develop market activities.   
 
JEL classification: C91, D14, G22, M31 
Keywords: earthquake insurance, public insurance, context effects. 
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1.    Introduction 
As documented in previous  empirical literature, consumers frequently reveal 
little  interest in  catastrophe insurance. 3
In this paper, we demonstrate that the context effect matters in the choice of PEI 
and private earthquake insurance, and that potential demand for earthquake 
insurance, both public and private, may be realized by adding a private contract to 
existing choice menus as either a decoy choice or a relevant alternative.  In addition, 
we interpret the inclusion of additional options in choice menus as an example of the 
choice architecture,  which is designed to manipulate  mildly  individual  preferences 
such that their liberty may be still respected (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009).    However 
soft it is, such choice architecture is frequently regarded as a serious hindrance to 
market activities.
    Those living in earthquake-prone areas 
seem reluctant to acquire a proper understanding of natural disaster insurance.    Such 
a pattern in insurance demand is often observed even when insurance premiums are 
publicly subsidized.    The public earthquake insurance (PEI), which is managed jointly 
by the government and private non-life insurance companies in Japan, shares these 
features of insurance demand.   
4
In Japan, a standard fire insurance policy offered by private non-life insurance 
companies  does not cover  a policyholder  for  fire damage resulting from natural 
disasters such as earthquakes,  volcanic eruptions,  or  tsunamis.  Since  1966, the 
Japanese Government  has  managed  the PEI  scheme  jointly with private  insurance 
companies to compensate for the absence of private coverage for fire damage resulting 
from earthquakes.  Under the PEI program, a policyholder has the option of attaching 
PEI  to  a  private fire insurance contract.    The PEI program covers not only fire 
damage, but also damage  resulting from collapsed buildings during earthquakes.  
  In our case, however, a change in choice menus does not obstruct 
information aggregation among private agents, but instead helps to correct consumers’ 
misperception about earthquake insurance.  At the same time, private insurers may 
be interested in developing complementary market activities together with PEI. 
                                                  
3  Schwarcz (2010) discusses the observation of weak demand for catastrophe insurance 
as an example of anomalies, citing McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey (1993), Krantz 
and Kunreuther (2007), Kunreuther et al. (1978), Kunreuther and Pauly (2004), and 
Slovic et al. (1977). 
4  Many papers point out several potential problems borne by the choice architecture.   
For example, Sugden (2008) discusses that market activities still dominate 
paternalistic policies even when individual preferences are incoherent, while Glaeser 
(2006) argues that governments may make serious mistakes in employing the choice 
architecture as a policy instrument.    Carlin, Gervais, and Manso (2009) also point out 
that setting default options may result in slow information aggregation in markets. 3 
 
However, PEI covers a maximum of half the house value appraised in a master fire 
insurance contract.  For example, when  a master fire insurance contract  covers a 
house worth 50 million yen, the house can be insured for up to 25 million yen against 
fire and collapse due to earthquakes under PEI. 
We have observed two puzzling phenomena associated with PEI  since its 
introduction  in 1966.  First, consumers do not necessarily exercise the  option  of 
attaching it  to their own private fire insurance, although being  largely  publicly 
subsidized PEI is inexpensive relative to corresponding private earthquake insurance.  
The percentage of households that had PEI was 12 percent in 1995 (fiscal year), 16 
percent in 2001, and 23 percent in 2009.  The proportion  of private fire insurance 
contracts with PEI options remained at 34 percent in 2001 and 47 percent in 2009. 
Second, private earthquake insurance has not been popular among consumers, 
although there should be potential demand for private earthquake insurance to cover 
the half of a house’s value that cannot be covered by PEI.    In addition, private non-life 
insurance companies are not necessarily interested in selling earthquake insurance as 
their own products, and carry only a modest range of earthquake insurance products 
for consumers.  For some reason, private insurance companies seem to have a low 
opinion of the potential of earthquake insurance markets for households.5
In this paper, we address the abovementioned phenomena.  We first investigate 
why consumers do not choose PEI offered on quite favorable terms, and secondly why 
there is no active market for private earthquake insurance designed for households.  
For this purpose, we focus particularly on the context effect as a behavioral aspect of 
insurance choice.   Such  a  context effect has been widely studied  in behavioral 
economics.    If any bias is observed in choice behavior, we explore how consumers may 
be nudged into being interested in public and private earthquake insurance. 
 
According to Simonson and Tversky (1992) and others, 6
                                                  
5  In contrast, there have been relatively active markets for natural disaster insurance 
designed for private corporations in Japan. 
  the background effect 
and the local effect are presented as the effects of contexts on choice.  In either effect, 
a  consumer is likely to choose a particular  option if it  appears more attractive by 
comparison  with  either  past experiences  (the background effect) or with currently 
available alternatives (the local effect).  In this paper, we pay close attention to both 
types of context effect. 
6  Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982) and Simonson (1989) report experimental studies to 
examine the effect of context on choice.    DellaVigna (2009) conducts a survey of field 
studies of several topics in behavioral economics including context effects. 4 
 
The basic idea underlying our study is quite simple.  On one hand, we explore 
how the choice of earthquake insurance changes if  a decision  maker has learning 
experience.   On the other hand, we examine whether a particular choice of insurance 
is more appealing to a decision maker if it is located in a different menu context. 
For this purpose, we conducted an  internet-based  questionnaire survey 
completed twice by an identical set of approximately 2,000 house owners in December 
2008 and November 2009.  From the 2008 questionnaire survey, we indeed observe 
that a substantial number  of respondents felt PEI  to be too costly, and were 
accordingly unwilling to purchase it.    They seemed to have little knowledge of PEI, 
and had distorted perceptions of it. 
Therefore, the next question arises: How can we nudge such unwilling consumers 
into purchasing public and private earthquake insurance?    In the 2009 questionnaire 
survey, we asked the same set of respondent householders whether they were 
interested in PEI in a realistic setup.    Then, we investigated the possibility that those 
who were unwilling to purchase PEI in December 2008 preferred the public program 
when they had learned about insurance through the 2008 survey. 
In addition, the respondent households in the 2009 survey were offered various 
choice menus in which not only PEI  but also hypothetical private earthquake 
insurance contracts were included with a list of insurance premiums.  We computed 
insurance premiums as realistically as possible.    We then explored the possibility that 
those who initially felt PEI to be too costly would participate in the public program if 
they revised their initial belief by comparing insurance premiums on a different choice 
menu.  There may even be a case where a respondent household was interested in 
purchasing not only PEI but also private earthquake insurance. 
At this point, we note that the context effect investigated in the present paper is 
broadly defined compared with conventional studies in the marketing literature.   A 
more conventional version of the context effect focuses purely on the effect of a change 
in background experiences or alternative menus by keeping the information set held by 
a  respondent  intact before and after a particular  environmental  change.7    On the 
other hand, our study considers the case in which respondents revise their information 
sets upon a change in experiences or menus.8
                                                  
7  As in Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982), for example, the decoy alternative is obviously 
inferior to the target, and can be regarded as an irrelevant choice.  Barbos (2010) 
proposes a theoretical model that account for the effect of inferior options on choice 
behavior. 
 
8  Luce (1959) presents a case where an additional option in a restaurant menu may 5 
 
The paper is organized as follows.    In Section 2, we briefly describe how the PEI 
works in Japan.    Section 3 reports the results and estimation of the questionnaire 
survey in 2008.    In Section 4, we explain how  hypothetical  choice  menus  are 
constructed in the 2009 follow-up survey.   In Section 5, we investigate whether the 
background context effect is present by comparing the 2008 and 2009 surveys, and 
whether the local context effect is significant by analyzing how households responded 
to an irreversible sequence of alternative choice menus  of insurance.  Section 6 




2.    Public earthquake insurance in Japan 
As explained in the Introduction, standard fire insurance  policies  offered by 
private non-life insurance companies do not cover damage resulting from a natural 
disaster such as an  earthquake, volcanic eruption, or  tsunami.    In  1966,  the PEI 
program  was  introduced to compensate for the absence of private coverage for  fire 
damage caused by natural disasters. 
This public program has the following features.9
The PEI  scheme  falls  under  the public earthquake insurance  law  as follows.  
The national government and private non-life insurance companies jointly manage the 
reinsurance part of this scheme, while private insurance companies are responsible for 
  First, a PEI contract is not 
offered alone, but is provided as an option with a private fire insurance policy.    That is 
to say, one cannot purchase PEI alone.    Second, it covers both structural damage and 
damage to household goods.  The coverage is up to a half of that in a master policy for 
fire insurance.  The maximum benefit is 50 million yen for housing construction and 
10 million yen for household goods, respectively.  Third, PEI covers damage from both 
fire and collapse  due to an earthquake,  whereas  master insurance covers only fire 
damage. 
                                                                                                                                                             
bring about more information concerning the overall quality of a chef at the restaurant.   
Prelec, Wernerfelt, and Zettenmeyer (1997) present an experimental study in which 
decision makers make inferences about their own preferences from what is available in 
a given choice menu. 
9  The Non-Life Insurance Rating Organization of Japan (2008) illustrates the practice 
of the PEI program of Japan in detail. Saito (2002) and Sato (2009) discuss the 
economic role played by the PEI system in sharing natural disaster risks.  Froot 
(1999) presents several cases in which a reinsurance capacity for natural disaster 
insurance is supported by a public program in the U.S. 6 
 
selling earthquake insurance contracts when marketing their fire insurance products.  
The private insurance companies deposit the premiums they collect from households in 
both their own accounts and a special government account after deducting operational 
costs.  They are not allowed to earn profit under the  nonprofit principle, which is 
stipulated by the law.  In March 2010, the total outstanding reserves of the private 
insurance companies amounted  to 969 billion yen, while the governmental special 
account had accumulated 1.260 trillion yen. 
In  the  reinsurance scheme, the private insurance companies offer protection 
against lower-layer risks, while the government provides the capacity for higher-layer 
risks.    More  specifically,  the insurance companies are solely responsible for a  low 
layer to 115 billion yen.  For a medium layer between 115 billion and 1.925 trillion 
yen, the government and insurance companies divide  the payment obligation into 
halves.  For  a high layer between 1.925 and 5.5 trillion yen, the government bears 95 
percent of the payment burden, and the insurance companies share only five percent.  
For example, in the case of the Southern Hyogo Earthquake (Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake), the government bore 177.5  billion yen, and the private insurance 
companies shared 292.5 billion yen. 
Under the above scheme, the layer above 5.5 trillion is not covered at all.  This 
ceiling corresponds to the projection of the total payment obligation when there is an 
earthquake equivalent to the Great Kanto Earthquake in terms of physical damage. 10
The insurance premium is basically set by individual prefectures.  That is, the 
premium reflects an interprefectural difference  in  earthquake risk, but no 
intraprefectural difference.  More specifically, the premium is classified into four 
grades according to the historical frequency of earthquakes in each prefecture.  For 
example, prefectures  such as Tokyo and Shizuoka, where a severe earthquake is 
expected to occur in the near future, is classified as fourth grade or the highest degree 
of risk. 
  
When the payment obligation exceeds the outstanding amount of the special account, 
the government can issue public bonds to finance the resulting deficits under the PEI 
law. 
The premium also depends on whether housing is  constructed of wood  (more 
expensive) or nonwooden  materials.  In addition, premiums are  discounted by 10 
                                                  
10  Note that the payment schedule along with the ceiling applies to one earthquake 
event.    An earthquake that occurs more than 72 hours after the initial event is 
counted as another event. 7 
 
percent when an insured house was built after 1981, when a new construction code was 
enforced, and by as much as 30 percent when a property is highly earthquake resistant.   
With respect to a house built in the fourth grade area after 1981, the annual insurance 
premium  for coverage of 10 million yen is  16,900 yen for buildings of nonwooden 
construction and 31,300 yen for those of wooden construction as of 2009.  Once the 
risk is switched from the fourth grade to the first, the premium is reduced to 5,000 yen 
for a nonwooden house and 10,000 yen for a wooden one. 
Due to the publicly supported reinsurance capacity and a nonprofit principle, PEI 
premiums are  rather inexpensive  relative to underlying risk  from  an  actuarial 
perspective. 11
Below, we investigate the  kinds  of factors that  may be  responsible for the 
abovementioned unpopularity of the PEI, and the kind of mild intervention that may 
promote participation in the scheme. 
    In addition, most of the annual premium is deductible from national 
and local taxation.  Nevertheless,  as our 2008  survey shows, it has not been 
recognized among households that the premium is much less expensive than those on a 
commercial basis, and that it is mostly deductible from annual income.  Consequently, 
on  the  national average, only 23  percent  of households purchased PEI  in 2009, 
although the participation ratio among households increased slowly from 12 percent in 
1995 and 16  percent  in 2001.  The ratio of private fire insurance  policies 
supplemented by PEI was 34 percent in 2001 and 47 percent in 2009. 
 
 
3.  Demand for PEI: An analysis of the 2008 survey 
3.1. An overview of the 2008 survey 
As mentioned in the Introduction, in  December  2008 we conducted a 
questionnaire survey of 2,553 house-owning households 12
                                                  
11  The premium for PEI is computed as an actuarially fair value under the assumption 
that government finances will suffer losses over a long period of time. 
  that responded through a 
website.  The questions covered their socioeconomic characteristics such as income, 
financial wealth, and age of housing.   Some questions to ascertain the respondents’ 
knowledge and perceptions  of  PEI were also included.    We  entrusted  the Nomura 
Research Institute (NRI) with conducting the internet-based survey mainly because 
the NRI had  a  relatively  large nationwide panel of households with a reasonable 
12  In addition to 2,553 house owners, the 2008 questionnaire survey included 828 
lessee householders, who were asked whether they had purchased PEI for household 
goods, but the current study excludes them from the sample. 8 
 
proportion of high-income earners. 
According to the 2008 survey, the sample house  owners  did  not participate 
actively in the PEI scheme.  Only 31 percent of the sample households held PEI for a 
residential building.  Participation in the PEI  program increases with household 
income.    The participation ratio for the annual income class below 2.5 million yen 
(between 2.5 and 5 million yen) is 11.6 percent (19.7 percent), much lower than the 
average rate of 31 percent. 
The participation rate also depends on the age and resistance to seismic intensity 
of houses.    Only 17 percent of houses built prior to 1981 were insured under the public 
program; the participation rate is even lower, at eight percent, for houses built before 
1960.  On the other hand, 34 percent of houses constructed after 1981 were insured 
under PEI. 
However, such a low participation rate does not necessarily imply that the 
sample households were not aware of earthquake risks.  Among the respondents, 31 
percent thought that a large-scale earthquake was likely, while 48 percent thought 
that it would probably occur.  That is, about  four  out of  five  households took the 
likelihood  of  a  large-scale earthquake  into consideration.  Reflecting such 
considerable concern over earthquake risks, even 48 percent of those who did not hold 
a PEI policy wished they did, while only 17 percent did not think it necessary.  The 
remainder did not consider the public program to be necessary. 
The 2008 survey asked those who did not join the PEI program why they did not 
wish to.    Each respondent was allowed to choose multiple responses.  Half believed 
that the insurance premium was too expensive, and another quarter felt that it was a 
little expensive.    This tendency is even stronger among those with lower incomes.  As 
another reason for not purchasing the PEI, 22 percent considered coverage provided by 
the program rather insufficient because only half the value of a master fire insurance 
policy could be covered; those with higher incomes tended to feel this way. 
For both holders and nonholders of PEI, the survey asked about alternative tools 
to insure against possible damage resulting from a large-scale earthquake, including 
public aid, withdrawal from deposits, borrowing, and family support; each respondent 
was allowed to choose two alternatives.  Among PEI  policyholders,  80  percent 
considered PEI a primary tool, and only 22 percent expected to rely on public relief 
programs.  Among the nonholders, on the other hand, 32 percent depended on public 
aid, and 64 percent considered relying on their own savings as their main instrument. 9 
 
The 2008 survey also asked the respondents about their understanding of how 
the PEI program worked.  About  80 percent of the respondent house owners showed a 
relatively  good understanding  that a standard private fire insurance policy  cannot 
cover  earthquake  damage.  However, the sample householders did not fully 
understand how the program compensates for the absence of private coverage.  For 
example, only 38 percent of the householders in the sample knew that the insurance 
premium was largely at a bargain level thanks to public assistance.  More than 50 
percent of the entire sample did not know that the premium was substantially 
discounted for earthquake-resistant houses, or that the premium was  income tax 
deductible. 
In the final section of the 2008 survey, we asked respondents whether they had 
improved their understanding of PEI through participating in the 2008 questionnaire.   
Among those who did not have PEI, 76 percent felt that their understanding had been 
improved.  What is more, 70  percent  of those who understood better  were more 
interested in participating in the PEI program.  In Section 5, we exploit a change in 
perceptions  of  PEI  that were driven by the questionnaire  experience  to identify 
whether the background context effect influences  choice behavior for  earthquake 
insurance. 
 
3.2. Estimation results from probit analysis 
In this subsection, we explore which factor is responsible for holding a PEI policy 
using a probit specification.    To focus on choice behavior for PEI, we exclude the house 
owners who held earthquake mutual  insurance  policies  offered by the agricultural 
cooperative association.    The sample size is thus reduced slightly from 2,553 to 2,397. 
A dependent variable takes a value of one if a respondent held insurance, and is 
otherwise zero.   A set of explanatory variables  were  included  as household 
characteristics: the age of the head of household, the log of annual income, the log of 
balance of financial assets, and the presence of a housing loan.  We employ some 
variables to represent earthquake resistance of housing, including a dummy variable 
for wooden structure, one for the age of a house (one for a house built prior to 1981 or 
under the old building code), and the degree of prefectural risk measured between one 
(safest) and four (highest risk). 
For the variables associated with ex post financing of earthquake damage, we 
adopt a series of Yes (1)/No (0) answers to questions such as whether a respondent 10 
 
plans to withdraw funds from deposits, whether he/she expects public assistance, and 
whether he/she understands how the public disaster relief program works.    For the 
last question, we  note that the public program is not very  generous; the current 
disaster relief program operated by the central government 13
In addition, explanatory variables include Yes  (1)/No  (0) answers to questions 
such as whether a respondent feels that the PEI premium is too high, whether the 
respondent or family members have ever experienced large-scale earthquakes in the 
past, and whether he/she expects an earthquake to occur in the near future. 
  provides only a 
maximum of three million yen for earthquake victims who plan to rebuild damaged 
houses. 
We make one  comment on a peculiar feature of housing loans.  The  standard 
type of housing loan in Japan is a recourse loan rather than  a nonrecourse loan.  
Accordingly, even if a collateralized house is severely damaged by a natural disaster, a 
debtor is still obliged to repay the outstanding loan.    That is, a debtor is forced to bear 
all disaster risks.  In this special respect, a household with a housing loan may have 
stronger demand for natural disaster insurance. 
Table 1 reports the estimation result for  the probit model analysis.  The 
estimated coefficients for  all explanatory variables except past experience are 
statistically significant at either the one or five percent levels. 
The probability of holding  PEI  increases with both household income and 
financial wealth.  That is, rich households had  strong demand for earthquake 
insurance.    Stronger demand among households with housing loans is consistent with 
the abovementioned fact that in Japan a housing loan is of the recourse type. 
Households in places with higher risk had stronger demand for the insurance.  
The estimated coefficient on the cross-term of the degree of land risk and a dummy 
variable for wooden construction, however, imply that a householder owning a wooden 
house in a place with greater risk yielded  weaker demand for the insurance.  
Householders who built a house prior to 1981 also had less demand for insurance.  As 
mentioned in Section 2, insurance premiums are more expensive for wooden buildings 
and old houses.  Thus, these estimation results may be interpreted to mean that 
costly premiums depress insurance demand  to some extent.  Another interesting 
finding is that insurance demand depends strongly on concerns about  future 
                                                  
13  In addition to the central government program, local governments offer disaster 
victims similar financial assistance.    See the Cabinet Office (2009) for details of 
several versions of the government disaster relief program. 11 
 
earthquakes, but not on past experiences of family members. 
In terms of ex post financing of repairs to earthquake damage, householders who 
planned  to cover damage  by  withdrawal from deposits had  weaker  demand  for 
earthquake insurance.  That is, self-insurance works as a substitute for earthquake 
insurance.  Householders who prefer to rely on public assistance also yielded weaker 
demand.  This result may imply that a form of time inconsistency problem impedes 
the development of the PEI program. 
Those who had a good understanding of how the public disaster relief program 
worked tended to prepare for earthquakes by purchasing insurance.    This result may 
indicate that such households recognized a severe limitation of the public program, 
and wanted to compensate for financial shortages by holding earthquake insurance.  
In  this regard, those who understood the public programs correctly  behaved  quite 
differently from those who expected public assistance in a vague manner. 
From the viewpoint of our study, one of the most important estimation results is 
that those who felt that the PEI premium was too expensive were less likely to hold it.  
Their perception of insurance costs is somewhat groundless because the premium is 
cheap relative to the underlying risks, mainly because of both the nonprofit principle 
and public involvement in the reinsurance scheme.  Conversely, once the above 
misperception of insurance costs is corrected by some form of intervention, potential 
demand for earthquake insurance may be realized. 
 
 
4.    The 2009 questionnaire survey 
4.1. A sequence of choice menus 
Using the identical sample of 2,397 house owners used in the 2008 survey, 14  we 
conducted an internet-based questionnaire survey in November 2009. 15
                                                  
14  For the same reason as above, we exclude from the sample the respondent 
householders who held an earthquake mutual insurance contract offered by the 
agricultural cooperative association. 
  To identify 
the context effect in insurance choice, the 2009 survey focused purely on how 
respondents changed their choice of earthquake insurance in response to a variation 
between one hypothetical choice menu and another.  The choice menu included not 
only PEI, but also a hypothetical private earthquake insurance contract with a list of 
insurance premiums. 
15  The NRI was again entrusted with conducting the 2009 survey. 12 
 
As described in detail in the next subsection, we computed a respondent-specific 
premium for PEI as realistically as possible by exploiting the household information 
we obtained through  the 2008 survey.  For  a  hypothetical private earthquake 
insurance contract, we referred to the premiums of the earthquake insurance products 
sold by two major non-life insurance companies.  We also computed a premium for a 
hypothetical public earthquake insurance contract  by making some heroic 
assumptions. 
A basic idea in our study was to pin down the background context effect by a 
difference in choice behavior between the 2008 and 2009 surveys, and to identify the 
local context effect by the  change in choice behavior between  hypothetical  choice 
menus. 
For this purpose, we prepared a sequence of choice menus as follows.  The first 
choice menu offered to a respondent in that sequence includes a private fire insurance 
contract with coverage of 20 million yen, and PEI with coverage of 10 million yen as an 
option.    As mentioned in Section 2, PEI can provide only half the coverage of a master 
fire  insurance  contract, while it covers damage  not only from fire,  but also from 
collapse. 
The menu was offered to each respondent together with a list of insurance 
premiums.  We could compute quite a realistic list of respondent-specific insurance 
premiums  for  both  a  private fire insurance contract  and  PEI  by exploiting the 
household information obtained through the 2008 survey.  Once the first choice menu 
was presented, each respondent household was asked to choose either (1) only private 
fire insurance, (2) both private fire insurance and PEI, or (3) neither. 
We consider that the menu presented to respondents in the 2009 survey is quite 
similar to that faced by  a  typical  consumer  when considering choosing  PEI.  As 
mentioned in the Introduction, in Japan private insurance companies are not greatly 
interested in selling their own earthquake insurance products to households, and they 
carry only a rather modest range  of earthquake insurance products for consumers.   
Accordingly, they often only offer consumers PEI as a possible option for earthquake 
insurance. 
The 2008 survey shows whether each respondent householder actually held PEI 
as of  December 2008.  Therefore, by comparing the two surveys, we can observe 
changes in respondent households’ choice behavior regarding PEI between December 
2008 and November 2009.    We attribute a change in the choice behavior between 2008 13 
 
and 2009 to respondents’  experiences  in the intervening  period.  Such experiences 
include responding to the 2008 survey.  In this way, we may identify the background 
context effect through comparison of the 2008 and 2009 surveys. 
In the second to the fourth choice menus, we included  hypothetical private 
earthquake insurance contracts as additional options, and even a hypothetical public 
earthquake insurance contract in the fourth menu.  The second choice menu added a 
hypothetical private earthquake insurance contract with coverage of 10 million yen for 
fire/collapse  damage  resulting from earthquakes as an additional choice.  That is, 
such a hypothetical private earthquake insurance contract differs from the PEI only in 
terms of premiums, and holding  both public and private insurance provides full 
coverage,  or 20 million yen,  for earthquake damage.  As discussed in the next 
subsection, we computed a premium for the above hypothetical insurance contract as 
realistically as possible.    Without public subsidy, the hypothetical private earthquake 
insurance is much more expensive than PEI. 
Once the second choice menu was presented, each respondent household was 
asked to choose either (1) private fire insurance only, (2) both private fire insurance 
and  PEI, (3) private fire insurance, PEI, and the  hypothetical private earthquake 
insurance, or (4) no insurance.    Given the price advantage of PEI, there was no reason 
to believe that respondents were interested in private fire and earthquake insurance 
contracts without PEI. 
The inclusion of the  above hypothetical private insurance yields two possible 
effects in terms of earthquake insurance choice.  First, by comparing premiums for 
public and private earthquake insurance, consumers may recognize that PEI is indeed 
cheap relative to the private alternative.    That is, if a consumer initially believes that 
PEI is costly, he/she may revise this initial belief immediately after observing a list of 
premiums, and reconsider purchasing it.  In this regard, we are particularly 
interested in respondent householders who did not choose PEI from the first choice 
menu but did so from the second as convincing evidence for the local context effect. 
Second, private earthquake insurance compensates for insufficient coverage 
provided  by PEI.    Consequently,  its  inclusion may realize potential demand for 
private earthquake insurance.  In this regard, we are particularly interested in 
respondent householders  who chose both public and private earthquake insurance 
from  the second choice menu.  We call the  potential impact of a choice menu a 
market-enhancing effect.  Such effects have nothing to do with context effects, but 14 
 
may be  significant  for Japanese private insurance companies that have been  fairly 
passive in the market for natural disaster insurance for households. 
In constructing the third and fourth choice menus, we consider private and public 
earthquake insurance contracts covering damage from fires but not collapse.    A major 
reason for this consideration is that consumers who purchase private fire insurance 
contracts may only be interested in cover for fire damage resulting from earthquakes, 
and an insurance contract with excessive coverage may hinder the choice of 
earthquake insurance. 
In the third choice menu, a hypothetical private earthquake insurance contract 
covers only fire damage.  It is assumed that a consumer must  hold  this private 
insurance together with PEI  against  earthquake risk, and cannot purchase private 
insurance alone.    As described below, we  could compute  a premium for the above 
hypothetical private insurance as realistically as possible. 
Once the third choice menu was presented, each respondent household was asked 
to choose either (1) private fire insurance alone, (2) both private fire insurance and 
PEI, (3) private fire insurance, PEI and hypothetical private earthquake insurance, or 
(4)  no  insurance.  The menus were constructed in such a way as to prevent 
respondents from choosing private fire and earthquake insurance contracts only. 
In this choice menu, consumers could consider private earthquake insurance with 
moderate coverage a reasonable choice, and be interested in it.  In other words, 
potential demand for private earthquake insurance is more likely to be realized.  We 
also consider this impact of a choice menu a market-enhancing effect. 
The fourth choice menu excludes PEI from the third choice menu, and instead 
includes  a  hypothetical public earthquake insurance contract  that  covers only fire 
damage.    That is, in the fourth choice menu, not only private but also public insurance 
covers only fire damage resulting from earthquakes. 
Once the fourth  menu was presented, respondent households were  asked to 
choose either (1) private fire insurance only, (2) both private fire insurance and the 
hypothetical public earthquake insurance, (3) private fire insurance, hypothetical 
public earthquake insurance, and the hypothetical private earthquake insurance, or 
(4) no insurance.  Given the price advantage of the hypothetical public earthquake 
insurance, there was no reason to believe that respondents were interested in holding 
private fire and earthquake insurance only. 
In this case, a consumer who does not purchase PEI from the first choice menu 15 
 
may be interested in purchasing the above hypothetical public earthquake insurance 
not only because the premium is reasonable, but also because of its coverage.  Here, 
we have an opportunity to identify both local context effects and market-enhancing 
effects. 
To identify local context effects  and market-enhancing effects as precisely as 
possible, we constructed the 2009 questionnaire survey so that a series of choice menus 
was offered to each respondent in a fixed sequence.  That is, respondents could not 
jump back to any question they had already answered. 
 
4.2. Computation of insurance premiums 
We now describe how the premiums for fire and earthquake insurance contracts, 
including hypothetical ones, are calculated.  We assume that the benefits of fire and 
earthquake insurance  contracts included in each choice menu are uniform among 
respondent  households.  Specifically, the benefit from  private fire insurance is 20 
million yen, while that of any kind of earthquake insurance is 10 million yen.    That is, 
the PEI  covers  the  first 10 million yen, and a hypothetical private earthquake 
insurance contract is responsible for another 10 million yen. 
We referred  private insurance premiums to Tokyo Marine Nichido Fire and 
Marine Insurance (Tokyo Marine)  and Sompo Japan Insurance (Sompo Japan),  two 
major Japanese insurance companies.  The fire insurance market is quite competitive, 
and there is no significant difference in premiums between  the two insurance 
companies.  A fire insurance premium  is determined according to whether a 
residential building is wooden or nonwooden, and if wooden, whether it is fireproof, 16
Under PEI, on the other hand, a premium depends mainly on whether a residence 
is wooden or nonwooden, and whether it was built prior to or after 1981 (when the new 
building code came into effect).    In addition, a premium is classified into four grades, 
from Grade 1 (least risk) to Grade 4 (greatest risk), depending on the prefecture in 
which the residence is located.
 
and if nonwooden, whether it is a detached house or condominium.  Thus, there are 
four premium patterns in private fire insurance. 
17
                                                  
16  A wooden 2 × 4 structure is regarded as fireproof. 
  Therefore, there are sixteen premium patterns in 
PEI. 
17  To be precise, the insurance premium for PEI differs slightly among prefectures 
with the same degree of risk.    We apply the insurance premium for the most populous 
prefecture.    For example, the premium for Tokyo is applied to Grade 4 prefectures, 
while the premium for Saitama/Osaka is applied to Grade 3 prefectures. 16 
 
It is relatively easy to compute a premium for both private fire insurance and PEI 
for each respondent household by exploiting the household  information obtained 
through the 2008 survey. 
The  more  difficult part is to compute premiums  for hypothetical private 
earthquake insurance contracts.    As mentioned in the Introduction, Japanese non-life 
insurance companies have only a modest range of earthquake insurance products for 
households, and they market these products mainly in the Tokyo metropolitan area.  
It is thus extremely difficult to compute premiums for private earthquake insurance 
contracts for the sample of respondent households located throughout Japan. 
Here,  we use two earthquake insurance products  as a reference point, one 
provided by Tokyo Marine and the other by Sompo Japan.  Tokyo Marine sells  an 
earthquake insurance policy  that  covers both fire and collapse damage  in Tokyo.  
Given limited information, we assume that premiums for insurance products depend 
on whether a residential building is wooden or nonwooden, whether it was built under 
the old building code or the new one, and if wooden, whether it is fireproof. 
Sompo Japan markets  a different type of earthquake insurance in Tokyo, 
covering  only fire damage  resulting from  earthquakes.  Here,  we assume that the 
premium  for  this insurance depends mainly on whether  the structure  is fireproof.  
Both the Tokyo Marine and Sompo Japan products  assume  that  the  policyholder 
participates in the PEI program. 
We make a large  assumption  in computing insurance  premiums  for  private 
earthquake insurance products sold in prefectures  other than Tokyo.  That is, we 
assume that the premium for a private earthquake insurance contract differs to the 
same extent as that for PEI among prefectures, from Grade 1 to Grade 4.    For example, 
for a nonwooden (wooden) house, the PEI  premium  in  Fukushima (Grade 1) is 30 
percent (32 percent) of that in Tokyo (Grade 4 prefecture).  Accordingly, we multiply 
the premium of the above products sold in Tokyo by 0.3 (0.32) to compute a premium 
for a nonwooden (wooden) house located in Fukushima. 
How can we calculate  the  premium  for  a hypothetical public earthquake 
insurance  contract  covering  only fire damage?  For this purpose, we again make 
rather generous assumptions.  We assume that for identical coverage, the ratio of a 
public relative to a private premium is constant among all types  of earthquake 
insurance.  In our context, the fixed ratio can be computed from PEI premiums and 
the Tokyo Marine product, both of which cover fire and collapse damage. 17 
 
For example, in the case of a nonwooden (wooden) house in a Grade 4 prefecture 
such as Tokyo, the premium for PEI is 56 percent (61 percent) that of the Tokyo Marine 
product.  Then, we multiply the premium for the Sompo Japan product covering only 
fire  damage  by 0.56 (0.61), thereby computing a premium for  a hypothetical public 
earthquake insurance contract with the same coverage.    In addition, we assume that 
the prefectural relative difference in premiums is identical between actual PEI and the 
above hypothetical public earthquake insurance. 
Table 2 summarizes the pattern of annual insurance premiums for public and 
private fire/earthquake insurance.    Table 3 reports a sequence of choice menus in the 
case where a house is detached, wooden, fireproof, built under the new building code, 
and located in a Grade 4 prefecture. 
According to Table 3, in the first choice menu private fire insurance with 20 
million yen coverage costs 20,000 yen per year, while PEI with 10 million yen coverage 
costs 28,200 yen.    When the first menu is offered, a respondent may gain the mistaken 
impression that PEI is more expensive with less coverage by comparing private fire 
insurance and PEI.    In the second choice menu, however, a respondent recognizes that 
PEI  (28,200 yen per year) is much less expensive than the  hypothetical private 
earthquake insurance (50,400 yen per year).  When the first menu is replaced by the 
second,  respondents  who  believe  that  PEI  is too expensive may  reconsider  their 
previous judgment.  In this study, such a behavioral change is interpreted as evidence 
for the local context effect. 
 
 
5.    Identification of context effects and market-enhancing effects: An analysis of the 
2009 survey 
5.1. Evidence for background context effects 
Of the 2,397 house-owning householders who responded to the 2008 survey, 2,047 
respondents participated in the 2009 questionnaire survey.   Let us first compare the 
2008 and 2009 surveys.  As discussed in the previous section, we attribute  the 
observed differences in the choice behavior regarding the PEI to experiences in the 
corresponding period, including the  respondents’  participation in the 2008 survey.  
Through such a comparison, we may identify the background context effect. 
Among the  2,047  respondents who participated in both the 2008 and 2009 
surveys,  34  percent,  or 693 households,  actually  held  PEI  in  December  2008.  18 
 
Responses to the first choice menu in the 2009 survey reveal that 49 percent or 994 
households preferred PEI in November 2009.  Although the 2009 questionnaire only 
asked about  possible preference, not actual holdings, the above comparison  implies 
that preference for PEI was much stronger among respondent householders. 
According to Table 3, 21 percent of the sample of 1,354 households that did not 
hold PEI in December 2008 revealed a preference for PEI in the 2009 survey.  The 
number of respondents who adopted it  (428 households) is much greater than the 
number of respondents who abandoned it (127 households). 
To focus on the effect of the survey experience on choice behavior, we conducted a 
probit analysis for choice behavior regarding  PEI  using the 2009 survey  data.  In 
addition to a nearly identical set of  explanatory variables as before, we adopted  a 
dummy variable for whether a respondent had improved his/her understanding of PEI 
through their participation in the 2008 survey. 
Table 5 reports the estimation results of the probit analysis.  The estimation 
results are generally comparable to those of the probit analysis of the 2008 survey.  
However, we observe the following differences. 
First, the choice probability does not increase, but decreases with the degree of 
earthquake risk.    It indicates that prefectural differences in earthquake risk, which is 
the most important determinant of premiums, may dampen insurance preferences as a 
substantial cost factor.  Second, choice probability no longer depends on the age (old 
or new building codes) or  construction  (wooden or nonwooden) of a house.  Third, 
choice  probability  shows no statistically significant  increase  with financial wealth.  
Fourth, choice probability no longer depends  on  respondents’  recognition of  public 
disaster relief.    It may be inferred that most respondents had already recognized such 
public assistance by responding to the 2008 survey. 
One of the most important findings is that choice probability increases with a 
respondent’s knowledge of  PEI.  According to Table 5, the probability increases by 
about 11  percent  with  a better understanding of  insurance products.  We may 
interpret this finding as evidence for the background context effect. 
 
5.2. Evidence for local context effects and market-enhancing effects 
We now carefully examine the difference in choice behavior regarding earthquake 
insurance among various choice menus.  Among  the  2,047 householders  who 
responded to a fixed sequence of choice menus in the 2009 survey, 994 or 49 percent 19 
 
revealed a preference for PEI as an option to private fire insurance.  On the other 
hand, 38 percent (768 respondents) revealed a preference for private fire insurance 
alone, and 14 percent (285 respondents) were not interested in either. 
Given the second choice menu including  as an additional option  hypothetical 
private earthquake insurance against  both fire and collapse damage, some of the 
respondents who were not interested in PEI  in the first choice menu revealed a 
preference for it.    Specifically, according to Table 6-1, 20 percent (155 respondents) of 
the households (768 respondents) expressed a preference for  the public program.  
Among these, 44 respondents were also  interested in the  hypothetical private 
earthquake insurance. 
As suggested in the previous sections, inclusion of the  hypothetical private 
earthquake insurance would allow  each respondent to reconsider the PEI  as a 
reasonable insurance instrument.  We interpret this finding as evidence for the local 
context effect in insurance choice. 
We also observe the market-enhancing effect from a difference in the behavior 
between the first and second choice menus.  Among those who revealed a preference 
for PEI in the first choice menu (994 respondents), 26 percent (263 respondents) also 
revealed a preference for a hypothetical private earthquake insurance in the second.  
As mentioned above, 44 respondents who were not interested in PEI in 2008 revealed a 
preference for the private policy in the second choice menu.  These findings suggest 
that a change in choice menus generates potential demand for private products. 
There  were  33 respondents who abandoned  PEI.  Because  it is difficult  to 
rationalize such behavior, we exclude those respondents  from  estimation exercises.  
The same treatment was applied to the responses to the third and fourth choice menus. 
Because the respondent households responded to the third choice menu after the 
second  choice  menu, they had already understood that PEI  was quite reasonable 
relative to the hypothetical private policy with the same coverage.  Thus, the local 
context effect is expected in the third choice menu.   The local context effect is indeed 
slightly stronger in the third choice menu than in the second choice menu.    According 
to Table 6-2, the number of respondents joining the public program increased from 155 
to 193 (including those who were considering even a private policy). 
In the third choice menu, the hypothetical private earthquake insurance contract 
covers only fire damage.  With such modest coverage of a private insurance, the 
market-enhancing effect is expected to be stronger  for private insurance products.  20 
 
According to Table 6-2, among the respondents interested in PEI in the first choice 
menu, those who revealed a preference for private insurance increased from 263 (in the 
second choice menu) to 370. 
In the fourth choice menu, even public earthquake insurance is hypothetical in 
the sense that it is assumed to cover only fire damage.  Thus,  by observing the 
response to the fourth choice menu, we can explore  whether the market-enhancing 
effect works for both private and public products with such modest insurance coverage.   
According to Table 6-3, the number of respondents who adopted public products 
increased from 155 (in the second choice menu) or 193 (in the third choice menu) to 338 
(including those who were considering even a private policy).    On the other hand, the 
total  number of respondents who revealed  a preference for private earthquake 
insurance increased from 313 (in the second choice menu) or 449 (in the third choice 
menu) to 634. 
 
5.3. Estimation results based on the multinominal logit model 
In this subsection, we explore changes in  choice behavior in earthquake 
insurance between choice menus using a multinominal logit model.  We specify four 
alternatives for each set of choice menu items as follows. 
 
(i) First alternative: A respondent who revealed a preference for PEI in the first 
choice menu, and who chose both PEI and private earthquake insurance from 
the second, third, or fourth choice menu. 
(ii) Second alternative: A respondent who revealed a preference for PEI in the 
first choice menu,  and who chose only PEI  from  the second (third or fourth) 
choice menu. 
(iii) Third alternative: A respondent who revealed no preference for PEI in the 
first choice menu, but did so in the second (third or fourth) choice menu. 
(iv)  Fourth alternative: A respondent who revealed no  preference for PEI  in 
either choice. 
 
Here, the fourth alternative is set as a reference. 
As mentioned above, for the purpose of estimation we exclude those respondents 
who revealed a preference for PEI  in the first choice menu, but not in subsequent 
choice menus.  In addition, we exclude any observation with missing explanatory 21 
 
variables. 18  We employ the same set of explanatory variables as in Section 5.1.   
However, we exclude the  dummy variable for  recognition of public disaster relief, 
because most respondents who completed the 2008 survey had already recognized 
public assistance to some extent. 19
Before discussing the estimation results, we remark that the multinominal logit 
model is the  proper specification in our context.  In the main text, we employ the 
multinominal logit specification in which each alternative is independent.  In the 
appendix, we consider sequencing, by which the second (third or fourth) choice menu 
appears after the first choice menu using the nested logit model.    Specifically, for the 
second and third choice menus, the first and second alternatives are classified into one 
group where a respondent is interested in PEI in the first choice menu, while the third 
and fourth alternatives are categorized into another group where respondents are not 
at all interested.  As shown in the appendix, the multinominal logit model as a null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected against that of a nested specification. 
  The estimation results are reported in Tables 7-1 
to 7-3. 
For the fourth choice menu, on the other hand, the first to third alternatives are 
categorized into one group in the nested logit model.    The reason for this specification 
is that the hypothetical public earthquake insurance at the second stage differs from 
PEI  at the first stage, and there is no reason  to classify  the  four alternatives in a 
hierarchical manner depending on the choice behavior at the first stage.    As shown in 
the appendix, the multinominal logit model as a null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
against the above nested specification as an alternative hypothesis. 
Let us begin with the estimation results  based on the behavior in  the second 
choice menu (see Table 7-1).  It is possible to infer the local context effect from the 
estimated coefficients for the third alternative.  One of the most appealing findings 
for the local context effect is that it is strong among those who felt that PEI was costly 
when they responded to the 2008 survey.  In addition, the local context effect is also 
significant among those who were younger, expected public assistance in the case of an 
earthquake, or planned to compensate for earthquake damage from savings.  Another 
important finding is that the local context  effect does not depend on respondents’ 
wealth; that is, the local context effect seems to work across income classes. 
The estimated coefficients associated with the first alternative, on the other hand, 
                                                  
18  There are 11 observations from which the financial balance is missing. 
19  An estimation procedure often fails to converge once this dummy variable is 
included in a list of explanatory variables. 22 
 
suggest a market-enhancing effect or the realization of potential insurance demand.   
According to Table 7-1, the market-enhancing effect is strong among those who 
expected  an  earthquake in the near future.  It is also significant among old and 
wealthy respondents.  Conversely, the market-enhancing effect is weak among those 
who expected public assistance in the event of a crisis, relied on self-insurance, or lived 
in a wooden house. 
As Table 7-2 shows, the estimation result based on behavior in the third choice 
menu is similar to that reported in Table 7-1.  One important difference is that the 
market-enhancing effect is even stronger, with more significant coefficients associated 
with the first alternative.    Unlike the result in Table 7-1, the market-enhancing effect 
is present among those who held housing loans, or whose house was built under the old 
building code.  Another notable finding is that the local context effect is much more 
obvious  in the estimated coefficient for the third alternative.  That is, almost 
independently of household characteristics, the local context effect appears only among 
those who felt that a PEI contract was too costly. 
As discussed in the previous section, from the choice behavior in the fourth choice 
menu,  we can infer a  market-enhancing effect for not only private but also public 
products.  According to Table 7-3, the estimated coefficients associated with the first 
and third alternatives, if significant, are larger in most cases than those reported in 
Table 7-1, implying that the market-enhancing effect is stronger with modest coverage 
in both private and public insurance  products.  One interesting finding is that 
stronger demand for the hypothetical public earthquake insurance with coverage for 
fire damage alone is realized among those living in wooden houses. 
 
 
6.    Conclusion 
One of the most important findings is that PEI and private earthquake insurance 
products work  in  a complementary manner.  From  a private product in a choice 
context, a consumer properly recognizes the relative advantage of PEI in terms of its 
premium.  Comparison of PEI and the private product disproves a consumer’s belief 
that PEI is too expensive.  Adding private insurance products to an existing menu, on 
the other hand, compensates  for  the  insufficient coverage of PEI, thereby realizing 
potential demand for earthquake insurance. 
In addition, the above market-enhancing  effect is further amplified  by  proper 23 
 
insurance coverage.  According to our findings, there seems to be strong demand for 
coverage against fire damage, but not collapse damage.  From the behavioral change 
observed in the two surveys, we also find that greater demand is likely to be realized 
with better learning experiences. 
From  a normative perspective, our study uses context effect as a policy 
instrument to nudge consumers toward  better decisions.  That is, a proper 
combination of public and private insurance presented in a menu would aid in 
realizing  potential insurance demand.  In this sense, what we have  demonstrated 
here may be regarded as an example of the choice architecture proposed as an effective 
policy tool by Thaler and Sunstein (2009).  The contribution of our paper is the 
application of  context effects, which have been  employed intensively in marketing 
practice, to  the choice architecture,  for which previous studies have  used  default 
options, reference dependence, and framing effects as driving policy instruments. 20
What is more important, our case does not yield any adverse effects on market 
activities.  As pointed out by Carlin, Gervais, and Manso (2009), the choice 
architecture such as setting default options may slow information aggregation among 
private  agents.  In our case, however, including additional options helps private 
insurance companies to develop markets activities.  Consequently, private insurers 
themselves have a potential incentive to add their own products to choice menus.  In 
this sense, it is not  necessarily governments, but private agents that practice the 
choice architecture in our case. 
 
What then are the policy implications from our empirical exercise?  It may not 
be useful to expand the PEI program in terms scale and scope of coverage.  Instead, 
there is ample room for private companies to compete to compensate for the 
insufficient coverage offered by PEI.  With respect to scope, the current program 
seems to provide rather excessive coverage.    The PEI program should add at least one 
alternative contract covering only fire damage resulting from an earthquake.  With 
coverage of  modest scale and scope, PEI  would  stimulate  Japanese earthquake 
insurance markets in collaboration with a wide range of private products. 
   
                                                  
20  For example, Madrian and Shea (2001) show that the contribution rates in 401(k) 
depend on whether the default is nonparticipation or participation in retirement 
savings.  As a survey by Krishna and Slemrod (2003) confirmed, Schelling (1981) 
attributes a difference in taxpayers’ responses to tax exemption and tax surcharge to 
reference-dependence behavior, while Gourville (1998) indicates periodic tax payments 
over lump-sum tax payments as an example of framing effects. 24 
 
Appendix: Estimation by the nested logit model 
This appendix reports the estimation result based on the nested logit model in 
which the hierarchical nature of choice behavior is considered.  First, we classify the 
four alternatives according to whether a respondent revealed  a preference for PEI.  
That is, we classify the first and second alternatives into one group and categorize the 
third and fourth alternatives into another group.    We call the former Group Y and the 
latter Group N. 
For instance, the probability of participating in the  PEI  program in  the first 
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Similarly, the probability of not participating in the PEI program in the first choice 



















     
+ ++      
     
 
 
If  ρ   is equal to one under the above specification, then the nested logit model is 
reduced  to  the multinominal  logit model.   Tables A-1 to A-3  report the estimation 
results. 
According to these tables, the p value of the likelihood ratio test in which the null 
hypothesis is  1 ρ =   is 86.1 percent for the second choice menu and 14.6 percent for the 
third choice menu, and thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for these cases.  
Moreover, if the parameter  ρ   is set differently for Groups Y and N, the p value of the 
likelihood ratio test in which the null hypothesis is  1 YN ρρ = =   is 21.9 percent for the 
second choice menu and  84.4  percent  for the third choice menu.  Again, the 
multinominal logit specification fails to be rejected.  In sum, the multinominal logit 
model is the proper specification for the second and third choice menus. 25 
 
On the other hand, the  p  value  of the likelihood ratio test in  which the null 
hypothesis is  1 ρ =   is 0.06 percent for the fourth choice menu, and the null hypothesis 
is strongly rejected.    Moreover, if a parameter  ρ   is set at different values for the two 
groups,  the  p  value of the likelihood ratio  test  in  which the null hypothesis is 
1 YN ρρ = =   is 0.01 percent.  Again, the null hypothesis is strongly rejected. 
In the case of the fourth choice menu, however, the sequential nature disappears 
immediately after the actual PEI product is switched to a hypothetical one.    Thus, we 
alternatively classify the first to third alternatives as Group Y, and the fourth 
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If  ρ   is equal to one  under the above specification, the nested  logit model is 
reduced to the multinominal logit model.  As Table A-4 reports, the p value of the 
likelihood ratio test in which the null hypothesis is  1 ρ =   is 74.9 percent, and the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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0.3796 *** 0.1329 ***
(0.0648) (0.0225)




0.3765 *** 0.1236 ***
(0.0766) (0.0232)
-0.5251 *** -0.1881 ***
(0.0658) (0.0237)
-0.5007 *** -0.1650 ***
(0.0695) (0.0211)
0.7922 *** 0.3058 ***
(0.2194) (0.0842)
-0.5044 *** -0.1847 ***
(0.0627) (0.0235)
0.1051 *** 0.0369 ***
(0.0286) (0.0100)
-0.0404 ** -0.0142 **
(0.0175) (0.0062)
0.0103 *** 0.0036 ***
(0.0027) (0.0009)
0.1515 *** 0.0532 ***
(0.0551) (0.0193)








1. The standard errors are given in parentheses. 
2. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Having sense of expensiveness in public
insurance





A dummy of a household with a housing
loan
Constucted under the old building code
Having earthquake experiences
Expecting earthquakes in the near future
Covering losses by savings
Hoping for public assistance
Recognition of the public disater relief
Age of a household head
Household income in logarithm
Household financial assets in logarithm
Constant
Degree of land riskiness
Degree of land riskiness x Wooden house
dummy
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1 Wooden Fireproof Old 1 20,000 10,000 2,176 35,752 3,834
Non-fireproof 30,800 10,000 3,253 35,752 5,815
2 Wooden Fireproof Old 2 20,000 12,700 2,829 45,404 4,869
Non-fireproof 30,800 12,700 4,131 45,404 7,385
3 Wooden Fireproof Old 3 20,000 18,800 4,569 67,213 7,208
Non-fireproof 30,800 18,800 6,116 67,213 10,932
4 Wooden Fireproof Old 4 20,000 31,300 7,354 111,902 12,000
Non-fireproof 30,800 31,300 10,182 111,902 18,200
5 Wooden Fireproof New 1 20,000 9,000 2,176 16,087 3,834
Non-fireproof 30,800 9,000 3,253 16,087 5,815
6 Wooden Fireproof New 2 20,000 11,430 2,829 20,431 4,869
Non-fireproof 30,800 11,430 4,131 20,431 7,385
7 Wooden Fireproof New 3 20,000 16,920 4,569 30,244 7,208
Non-fireproof 30,800 16,920 6,116 30,244 10,932
8 Wooden Fireproof New 4 20,000 28,170 7,354 50,354 12,000
Non-fireproof 30,800 28,170 10,182 50,354 18,200
9 Non-wooden Detached Old 1 20,000 5,000 2,176 16,318 3,550
Condominium 7,200 5,000 2,176 16,318 3,550
10 Non-wooden Detached Old 2 20,000 6,500 2,829 21,213 4,615
Condominium 7,200 6,500 2,829 21,213 4,615
11 Non-wooden Detached Old 3 20,000 10,500 4,569 34,267 7,456
Condominium 7,200 10,500 4,569 34,267 7,456
12 Non-wooden Detached Old 4 20,000 16,900 7,354 55,153 12,000
Condominium 7,200 16,900 7,354 55,153 12,000
13 Non-wooden Detached New 1 20,000 4,500 2,176 7,343 3,550
Condominium 7,200 4,500 2,176 7,343 3,550
14 Non-wooden Detached New 2 20,000 5,850 2,829 9,545 4,615
Condominium 7,200 5,850 2,829 9,545 4,615
15 Non-wooden Detached New 3 20,000 9,450 4,569 15,419 7,456
Condominium 7,200 9,450 4,569 15,419 7,456
16 Non-wooden Detached New 4 20,000 15,210 7,354 24,818 12,000
Condominium 7,200 15,210 7,354 24,818 12,000
Table 2: Pattern of annual premiums for public and private earthquake insurance 
Public earthquake insurance premium for
10 mill. yen coverage
Private earthquake insurance premium for
10 mill. yen coverage Private fire insurance





The first choice menu
20,000 yen
20,000 yen 20,000 yen 20,000 yen
7,400 yen 28,200 yen
50,400 yen
Private earthquake insurance
for another 10 mill. yen
Public earthquake insurance
for 10 mill. yen coverage
28,200 yen
Private fire insurance for 20
mill. yen coverage
Table 3: An example of the annual premium pattern
Private earthquake
insurance for another




10 mill. yen coverage
12,000 yen
Private fire insurance for 20
mill. yen coverage
Private fire insurance for 20
mill. yen coverage
Public earthquake insurance
for 10 mill. yen coverage
28,200 yen
Private fire insurance for 20
mill. yen coverage
 (detached, wooden construction, fireproof, new building code, the riskiest area)
Public earthquake
insurance for 10 mill.
yen coverage
The second choice menu: Both public and private
earthquake insurance cover collapses as well as fire
damages.
The third choice menu: Public earthquake insurance
covers collapses as well as fire damages, but private
insurance covers fire damages only.
The fourth choice menu: Both public and
private earthquake insurance cover fire damages
only.
Public earthquake insurance




















Table 4: A comparison between the 2008 and 2009 questionaries
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0.2348 *** 0.0934 *** 0.2313 *** 0.0920 ***
(0.0660) (0.0261) (0.0660) (0.0261)
0.0674 0.0269 0.0711 0.0284
(0.0841) (0.0335) (0.0842) (0.0336)
-0.0112 -0.0044 -0.0080 -0.0032
(0.0757) (0.0302) (0.0768) (0.0306)
0.5249 *** 0.2032 *** 0.5275 *** 0.2041 ***
(0.0760) (0.0279) (0.0762) (0.0280)
-0.2965 *** -0.1179 *** -0.2965 *** -0.1179 ***
(0.0664) (0.0262) (0.0664) (0.0262)
-0.2661 *** -0.1054 *** -0.2652 *** -0.1051 ***
(0.0675) (0.0265) (0.0675) (0.0265)
0.3145 0.1241 0.3129 0.1235
(0.2401) (0.0924) (0.2404) (0.0925)
-0.3032 *** -0.1204 *** -0.2999 *** -0.1191 ***
(0.0658) (0.0259) (0.0659) (0.0259)






-0.2258 ** -0.0893 **
(0.1148) (0.0449)




0.0083 *** 0.0033 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0033 ***
(0.0027) (0.0011) (0.0027) (0.0011)
0.1515 *** 0.0604 *** 0.1517 *** 0.0605 ***
(0.0551) (0.0219) (0.0551) (0.0219)
0.0785 0.0313 0.0774 0.0309
(0.0626) (0.0250) (0.0626) (0.0250)
0.2853 *** 0.1127 *** 0.2849 *** 0.1125 ***
(0.0704) (0.0273) (0.0705) (0.0274)
-2.0260 *** -2.0605 ***
(0.4191) (0.4271)
Number of sample 2036 2036
Chi-square statisitics 164.41 165.00
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R-square 0.0583 0.0585
Log-likelihood -1328.27 -1327.98
1. The standard errors are given in parentheses. 







Table 5: Estimation results of a probit specification for the 2009 questionary
Land riskiness 4 (risky)
A dummy of a household with a housing
loan
Constucted under the old building code
Having earthquake experiences
Expecting earthquakes in the near future
Covering losses by savings
Constant
Degree of land riskiness
Degree of land riskiness x Wooden house
dummy
Specification 1 Specification 2
Parameter
estimates
Improved understanding of public
insurance due to the 2008 questionary
Hoping for public assistance
Wooden house
Age of a household head
Household income in logarithm
Household financial assets in logarithm
Recognition of the public disater relief
Having sense of expensiveness in public
insurance
Land riskiness 2 (moderately safe)
Land riskiness 3 (moderately risky)





Participating in both public
and private earthquake
insurance
Participating in private fire
insurance
Not participating in either
insurance
994 700 263 26 5
48.6% 70.4% 26.5% 2.6% 0.5%
768 111 44 594 19
37.5% 14.5% 5.7% 77.3% 2.5%
285 12 6 14 253
13.9% 4.2% 2.1% 4.9% 88.8%
(3) Not pariticipating in
either private fire insurance
or public earthquake
insurance
Table 6-1: The number of subjects at the fisrt and second stages
The second choice menu: Both public and private earthquake insurance cover collapses as well as fire damages.
At the firt stage
At the second stage
(1) Participating in public
earthquake insurance









Participating in both public
and private earthquake
insurance
Participating in private fire
insurance
Not participating in either
insurance
994 591 370 25 8
48.6% 59.5% 37.2% 2.5% 0.8%
768 124 69 554 21
37.5% 16.2% 9.0% 72.1% 2.7%
285 16 10 20 239
13.9% 5.6% 3.5% 7.0% 83.9%
(2) Pariticipating in private
fire insurance only
(3) Not pariticipating in
either private fire insurance
or public earthquake
insurance
Table 6-2: The number of subjects at the fisrt and second stages
The third choice menu: Public earthquake insurance covers collapses as well as fire damages, but private
insurance covers fire damages only.
At the firt stage
At the second stage









Participating in both public
and private earthquake
insurance
Participating in private fire
insurance
Not participating in either
insurance
994 441 508 33 12
48.6% 44.4% 51.1% 3.3% 1.2%
768 226 112 408 22
37.5% 29.4% 14.6% 53.1% 2.9%
285 22 14 19 230
13.9% 7.7% 4.9% 6.7% 80.7%
(1) Participating in public
earthquake insurance
(2) Pariticipating in private
fire insurance only
(3) Not pariticipating in
either private fire insurance
or public earthquake
insurance
Table 6-3: The number of subjects at the fisrt and second stages
At the firt stage
The fourth choice menu: Both public and private earthquake insurance cover fire damages only.
At the second stage
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0.0575 *** 0.1464 *** 0.0020
(0.0160) (0.0257) (0.0161)
-0.0309 * -0.0868 *** 0.0382 ***
(0.0174) (0.0256) (0.0134)
-0.0721 *** -0.0381 0.0340 **
(0.0149) (0.0252) (0.0163)






0.0028 -0.0891 ** -0.0278
(0.0259) (0.0384) (0.0213)
-0.0293 * 0.0150 -0.0032
(0.0151) (0.0228) (0.0130)
0.0013 * 0.0022 ** -0.0011 **
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0005)






0.1689 0.1013 *** -0.0013
(0.0168) (0.0256) (0.0154)





1. The standard errors are given in parentheses. 
2. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Hoping for public assistance
Table 7-1: Estimation results of a multi-nominal logit specification
for the case where public and private insurance cover collapses as
well as fire damges
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, and private
at the 2nd stage
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, but not












A dummy of a household with a housing
loan
Constucted under the old building code
Having earthquake experiences
Expecting earthquakes in the near future
Covering losses by savings
Household income in logarithm
Dummy of a high income household
Household financial assets in logarithm
Improved understanding of public
insurance due to the 2008 questionary
Having sense of expensiveness in public
insurance
Land riskiness 2 (moderately safe)
Land riskiness 3 (moderately risky)
Land riskiness 4 (risky)
Wooden house
Age of a household head
 
   37 
 
 
0.0515 *** 0.0489 ** -0.0020
(0.0198) (0.0244) (0.0163)




0.0907 *** 0.1149 *** 0.0276
(0.0187) (0.0246) (0.0171)
-0.0685 *** -0.0495 ** 0.0259 *
(0.0210) (0.0246) (0.0157)
-0.0983 *** -0.0116 0.0282
(0.0177) (0.0244) (0.0177)










0.0016 * 0.0021 ** -0.0010
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0007)






0.0432 ** 0.0747 *** 0.0193
(0.0196) (0.0246) (0.0166)





1. The standard errors are given in parentheses. 
2. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Table 7-2: Estimation results of a multi-nominal logit specification
for the case where public insurance covers collapses as well as fire
damges, but private insurance convers only fire damges
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, and private
at the 2nd stage
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, but not













A dummy of a household with a housing
loan
Constucted under the old building code
Having earthquake experiences
Expecting earthquakes in the near future
Covering losses by savings
Hoping for public assistance
Having sense of expensiveness in public
insurance
Land riskiness 2 (moderately safe)
Improved understanding of public
insurance due to the 2008 questionary
Land riskiness 4 (risky)
Wooden house
Age of a household head
Household income in logarithm
Dummy of a high income household
Household financial assets in logarithm
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0.1421 *** 0.0656 *** -0.0174
(0.0216) (0.0227) (0.0238)
-0.0728 *** -0.0422 * 0.0423 **
(0.0237) (0.0225) (0.0201)
-0.0715 *** -0.0355 * 0.0507 **
(0.0219) (0.0216) (0.0222)








0.0205 -0.0288 0.0383 **
(0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0185)
0.0021 ** 0.0014 -0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)






0.0590 ** 0.0567 *** 0.0412 **
(0.0231) (0.0220) (0.0209)





1. The standard errors are given in parentheses. 
2. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Table 7-3: Estimation results of a multi-nominal logit specification
for the case where both public and private insurance conver only
fire damges
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, and private
at the 2nd stage
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, but not












A dummy of a household with a housing
loan
Constucted under the old building code
Having earthquake experiences
Expecting earthquakes in the near future
Covering losses by savings
Hoping for public assistance
Having sense of expensiveness in public
insurance
Household income in logarithm
Dummy of a high income household
Household financial assets in logarithm
Improved understanding of public
insurance due to the 2008 questionary
Land riskiness 2 (moderately safe)
Land riskiness 3 (moderately risky)
Land riskiness 4 (risky)
Wooden house
Age of a household head
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1. The standard errors are given in parentheses. 
2. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Hoping for public assistance
Table A-1: Estimation results of a nested logit specification for the
case where public and private insurance cover collapses as well as
fire damges
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, and private
at the 2nd stage
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, but not












A dummy of a household with a housing
loan
Constucted under the old building code
Having earthquake experiences
Expecting earthquakes in the near future
Covering losses by savings
Household financial assets in logarithm
Improved understanding of public
insurance due to the 2009 questionary
Constant
Having sense of expensiveness in public
insurance
Degree of land riskiness
Wooden house
Age of a household head
Household income in logarithm
Dummy of a high income household
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0.8385 *** 0.8393 *** -0.0040
(0.1265) (0.1265) (0.0056)
-0.4697 *** -0.4710 *** -0.0000
(0.1088) (0.1088) (0.0009)
-0.4489 *** -0.4520 *** -0.0003
(0.1109) (0.1109) (0.0010)
-0.5075 *** -0.5073 *** -0.0014
(0.1079) (0.1079) (0.0022)












0.4689 *** 0.4690 *** -0.0027
(0.1161) (0.1161) (0.0038)










1. The standard errors are given in parentheses. 
2. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Having earthquake experiences
Table A-2: Estimation results of a nested logit specification for the
case where public insurance covers collapses as well as fire damges,
but private insurance convers only fire damges
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, and private
at the 2nd stage
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, but not












A dummy of a household with a housing
loan
Constucted under the old building code
Constant
Expecting earthquakes in the near future
Covering losses by savings
Hoping for public assistance
Having sense of expensiveness in public
insurance
Degree of land riskiness
Wooden house
Age of a household head
Household income in logarithm
Dummy of a high income household
Household financial assets in logarithm
Improved understanding of public










































1. The standard errors are given in parentheses. 
2. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
A dummy of a household with a housing
loan
Constucted under the old building code
Hoping for public assistance
Having sense of expensiveness in public
insurance
Having earthquake experiences
Expecting earthquakes in the near future
Covering losses by savings
Household financial assets in logarithm
Improved understanding of public
insurance due to the 2009 questionary
Constant
Degree of land riskiness
Wooden house
Age of a household head
Household income in logarithm
Dummy of a high income household
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, and private
at the 2nd stage
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, but not






Table A-3: Estimation results of a nested logit specification for the

















1.4756 0.8175 *** 0.1598
(0.9281) (0.2292) (0.8853)


















0.6696 *** 0.7060 *** 0.6228 ***
(0.2014) (0.2164) (0.2234)










1. The standard errors are given in parentheses. 
2. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Hoping for public assistance
Table A-4: Estimation results of an althernative nested logit
specification for the case where both public and private insurance
conver only fire damges
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, and private
at the 2nd stage
Participation in
public at the 1st
stage, but not












Purchase by housing loan
Constucted under the old building
standard
Having earthquake experiences
Expecting earthquakes in the near future
Covering losses by savings
Household financial assets in logarithm
Improved understanding of public
insurance due to the 2009 questionary
Constant
Having sense of expensiveness in public
insurance
Degree of land riskiness
Wooden house
Age of a household head
Household income in logarithm
Dummy of a high income household
 